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ABSTRACT 
 
High production and export subsidies in developed countries and high protection 
in both developed and developing countries have distorted rice trade. This study 
estimates the impact of rice policy distortions on developing countries’ rice production 
and trade potential. Because rice markets are highly segmented,  major rice types are 
differentiated to estimate the impact of current and likely policy reforms. Analysis in 
long-grain, high-quality rice focuses on rice import and export markets in Latin America 
and shows that reduction of direct and implicit export subsidies in the US will benefit 
regional suppliers such as Argentina and Uruguay. Analysis of Indonesia’s import market 
of ordinary long-grain rice, where protection is high, reveals that tariff hikes in this large 
importing country are in part a response to increased support from the exporting side. 
Level of domestic stocks also determines tariff movements. In the short/medium grain 
rice market, this study focuses on the highly supported and protected rice market in Japan 
and find that only aggressive rates of increase in import tariff-rate quota and reduction in 
production subsidies would have significant impact on import volume and price. Prices 
and trade would also be affected by a reduction of the high over-quota tariff.  
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For many developing countries, rice is the main staple and one of the most 
important sources of agricultural revenue at the farm and country levels.  One of the main 
problems that the rice sector in developing countries faces today is the lack of market 
opportunities at both local and international levels.  The lack of market opportunities 
translates especially into losses in income opportunities for small-scale rice producers, 
who are among the world’s poorest farmers.   
The rice production and trade policies in both developed and developing countries 
have shaped the structure of rice trade.  Rice market is thin as trade volume represented 
only 7% of rice consumption for the period 2000-2003 (FAO, 2005).  But the thinness of 
rice trade differs from its level of policy distortion, which is among the highest in 
agricultural commodity markets.  For instance, during 2002-2003, OECD rice producers 
received 22 billion USD of support per year, which is 11 % of total OECD agricultural 
support (OECD, 2005).  Such a high level of support reflects high implicit and direct 
export subsidies distorting rice trade, i.e., forcing rice to flow from high cost to low cost 
countries.  In contrast, rice farming and exports in developing countries, until recently, 
was severely taxed to protect consumers.  Moreover, high levels of import protection 
remain in large markets of both developed and developing countries. 
                                                 
1 Email: m.rakotoarisoa@cgiar.org.    2
Though reforms in the global rice market, since the start of the Uruguay Round, 
have focused on removing distortions,  the pace of reform has been slow.  Past studies 
have shown the positive impact that reforms would produce on global welfare. 
Nevertheless, they fall short in fully explaining the link between policy distortions and 
the problems facing rice sectors nowadays for two main reasons.  First, rice market is 
highly segmented, but past studies often used aggregated data thus, drawing rather vague 
policy implications and recommendations for specific countries or specific rice types.  
But, specific recommendations are needed to ensure the effectiveness of policies aimed at 
removing distortions in the rice trade and increasing welfare in many countries, 
especially developing countries that mostly produce or consume only one specific type of 
rice.  Second, interaction in rice policies between trading partners at the regional level 
remains unexplored.  Identifying these policy interactions, at least at the regional level, is 
needed to determine the sources and impact of distortions and to advance negotiations 
aimed at removing these distortions.  This study intends to address these needs. 
The main objective of this paper is to estimate the impact of rice policy distortions 
in both developed and developing countries, on developing countries’ rice production and 
trade potential between 1961 and 2002.  This paper is divided into four sections including 
this introduction. Section 2 describes rice market structure and reviews rice policies in 
selected developed and developing countries.  Section 3 analyzes the impact of policy 
distortions. In contrast to other studies, it differentiates between major rice markets since 
trading partners and levels of distortion differ depending on the quality, form, and 
varieties of rice.  Specifically, the study examines (i) the effects of reduction of actual   3
and implicit export subsidies from developed countries for high quality grain rice 
markets; (ii) the effects of the combination of and interaction between tariff reduction in 
importing countries and reduction of actual and implicit export subsidies for low quality 
grain rice; and (iii) and the effects of the combination of an increase in minimum access 
and tariff reduction in the importing side for short/medium grain market.  Section 4 
concludes the study and draws policy implications. 4 
2.  RICE MARKET SEGMENTATION AND POLICIES 
2.1  RICE MARKET SEGMENTATION 
Rice trade in the international market remains thin although rice trade volume as a 
percentage of production rose from 5% to 7 % between the periods of 1990-1999 and 
2000-2003.
2  Rice market is also segmented into different categories, essentially by 
variety, degree of processing, grain quality, and sources (USDA, FAO).  There is little 
substitution in consumption and production among countries. 
By variety: There are two major varieties of rice: indica, long grain rice, grown 
specifically in tropical regions, and Japonica (medium grain rice),   grown under a much 
cooler climate.  A distinction is often made within each of these major varieties to add 
into the classification the aromatic long grain rice and the glutinous (short or medium 
sticky) rice.  During 2001-2003, the variety indica represented 75 % of global trade; 
japonica, 12%; aromatic rice such as basmati from India and Pakistan, and jasmine from  
Thailand (10%); and (iv) glutinous (or sticky) rice (3%).  There are several types of rice 
under each of these major varieties. 
By degree of processing: There are mainly four main categories: paddy (rough), 
husked (brown), milled (white), and parboiled.  Milled rice has dominated global rice 
trade and represented 77 % of the volume share during 2001-2003.  However, trade in 
parboiled rice has increased over the years and reached 15 % of the total rice trade during 
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2001-2003.  Paddy and brown rice trade represented smaller shares at only about 
4%each.    
By quality of milled grain: The classification is based on the percentage of 
broken grain.  Trade in high quality milled rice has slightly increased during the last eight 
years.  High quality rice, with less than 20 % of broken grains represents three-fourth of 
the global trade during 2001-2003.   
By source: Some appellations are specific to the region or country of origin.  For 
instance, the different varieties of basmati rice are specific to India and Pakistan.  Also, 
for the same variety, form, and quality of rice, some consumers often view domestically 
produced rice as always different from imported rice.     
2.2  DETERMINANTS OF RICE POLICIES 
Rice is a major staple for several billion people in many countries; Table 1 gives 
an overview of rice production and trade for major rice countries.  Rice policies, 
however, have been based on protecting some social groups at the expense of others.  
Rich rice countries often protect their producers and exporters while poor rice countries 
protect mostly their consumers.  For rich rice countries, maintaining rice tradition and 
securing large profits for rice farmers and millers have been the main reasons for 
producer support.  For developing countries, food security concerns, especially the desire 
to provide cheaper rice to urban or non-farming consumers, which often have more 
political power, have been the reasons  for taxing rice farming.  These strategies have 
caused distortions in prices and resource allocation and in trade pattern.   6
Table 1—Rice production and trade in selected countries, 2002  
Country Yields  Paddy 
Rice (MT/ha) 






added per worker* 
(USD 1995 constant) 
1. Argentina  5.746        713,449  220,745  10,374.550 
2. Australia  8.607      1291,000  268,540  36,865.740 
3. Bangladesh  3.423    3,7851,000  -942,872  322.218 
4. Brazil  3.324    10,457,100  -531,998  5,086.847 
5. Cambodia  1.916    13,822,509  -17,227  421.817 
6. China  6.186   176,342,195  1,728,144  342.496 
7. Colombia  5.011       2,346,940  -62,355  3,636.244 
8. Egypt  9.141       5,600,000  463,021  1,331.858 
9. Guinea  1.613        845,000  -331,975  293.3051 
10. Guyana  3.825        443,700  174,247  4,267.472 
11. India  2.683  107,600,096  5,052,370  411.093 
12. Indonesia  4.469    51,489,696  -1,967,717  749.192 
13. Iran  4.727      2,888,000  -868,789  3,790.597 
14. Italy  6.270      1,371,100  504,619  27,654.190 
15. Japan  6.582    11,111,000  -626,902  34,140.070 
16. Korea  6.350      6,687,225  -151,299  14,743.210 
17. Laos  3.086      2,416,500  -26,400  624.339 
18. Madagascar  2.141      2,603,965  -61,082  156.128 
19. Malaysia  3.090       2,091,000  -518,205  6,929.884 
20. Mali  1.971        710,446  -10,076  286.595 
21. Myanmar  3.674    22,780,000  723,744  n.a. 
22. Nepal  2.675     4,132,600  -14,636  206.351 
23. Nigeria  1.024     3,192,000  -1,199,637  742.223 
24. Pakistan  3.018     6,717,750  1,670,491  698.227 
25. Peru  6.687     2,118,616  -34,175  1,850.983 
26. Philippines  3.280   13,270,653  -1,196,157  1,475.778 
27. Sri Lanka  3.489     2,859,480  -92,784  710.0172 
28. Suriname  3.940       163,410  42,975  3,619.626 
29. Tanzania  1.964       640,189  -67,475  190.289 
30. Thailand  2.609   26,057,000  7,336,663  878.126 
31. United States  7.373     9,568,996  285,701  53,402.960 
32. Uruguay  5.863      939,489  650,876  7,874.232 
33. Vietnam  4.590  34,447,200  3,201,000  258.498 
Note: (*) Year 2001 figures.  
Source:  United Nations (FAO); US Department of Agriculture; World Bank. 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates producer support in rice farming. It compares the level of 
support in terms of producer support estimates (PSE) in OECD and selected rice 
countries, between 1985 and 2002.  For example, India has taxed its rice producers for   7
almost ten years (1988-1998) while the OECD countries have heavily subsidized their 
producers up to an average of 80% of the amount of value of output during 1985-2002.   
Figure 1—PSE estimates for rice (%) 















The levels of PSE’s for OECD countries reflect high implicit export subsidies 
from the rich rice countries. OECD countries face artificially high domestic (producer 
and retail) prices and large surpluses because of the production support policy, declining 
per capita consumption, and increasing yield.  Export subsidies and shipping rice as food 
aid have become necessary means to get rid of the surpluses.  These distortions have 
contributed to lower world rice prices.  On the contrary, figures on the developing   8
countries’ PSE measures reflect taxation of rice farming and rice export in developing 
countries.  In fact, developing countries with rice surpluses have taxed their export (quota 
or ad valorem tax) or procured rice for food security and self sufficiency purposes and in 
many cases to increase government rent.  These taxations have reduced the 
competitiveness of rice export.  It is only in recent years that governments in rice 
producing countries lifted the barriers and begun supporting their rice export. 
Despite the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), governments in 
both developed and developing countries producing rice have maintained high levels of 
protection.  Developed countries’ reason for high tariff is primarily to protect their high 
cost rice farming and milling industries from the entry of cheaper rice, and to maintain 
their rice farming tradition.  For developing countries, especially large producing and 
consuming nations, rice self-sufficiency and protection of domestic rice sector constitute 
the main motives for high protection.  Rice protection policies, however,   differ by 
variety, quality, degree of processing,  and origin of rice.  Overall, protection is far higher 
for japonica rice than for Indica rice.  Wailes (2003) estimated that weighted rice tariff 
average is 217 % for japonica compared to 21 % for indica.  The tariff for low quality 
grain rice is much higher than for high quality rice.  Also, tariff escalation dominates the 
rice market as protection for milled rice is higher than for brown and paddy rice. 
2.3  RICE POLICIES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
This section outlines rice policies in high-income countries and the sources of 
policy distortions, especially in the European Union, Japan, Korea, and the United States.    9
Information used here comes mainly from the United States Department of Agriculture, 
Economic Research Service and Foreign Agricultural Service, and Wailes (2003).  
Specific information for individual countries also come from Fukuda, Dyck and Stout 
(2003) for Japan; Beghin, Bureau and Park (2003) and Sumner and Lee (2003) for Korea; 
Huang (2002) for Taiwan; and Childs (2003) for the United States.  Specific producer 
support estimates are compiled from the USDA, OECD, Mullen et al. (2004), and 
Thomas and Orden (2004).  
High levels of producer support and import protection have characterized rice 
policies in OECD countries.  Figure 2 illustrates the levels of these distortions among 
individual countries, measured in terms of nominal producer support equivalent (PSE).  
The supports peaked just before 1995 and declined until 1997; but they slowly returned to 
high levels after 1998, especially in the US..  Moreover, high protection and tariff 
escalated on the importing side especially in Korea and Japan on short and medium grain 
rice.   10 











































Source: OECD (2005). 
OECD Production Support Policies 
In the EU, producer support amounts to 351 Euros per ton and includes 
intervention stocks to support paddy price and direct payment to farmers. 
In Japan, total rice support costs taxpayers an equivalent of 2.8 billion US dollars 
(USD) per year as most of the support is in the form of import restrictions which raise the 
domestic price, implicitly taxing consumers.  A producer price floor based on moving 
average past-prices is in place.  As a result, producer price in Japan is ten times higher 
than that of other japonica rice produced in other countries such as China.  Moreover,   11
consumer price in Japan is three times higher than that in the rest of the world. To avoid 
large surpluses, Japanese rice farmers receive payments to reduce their acreage under the 
Production Adjustment Promotion Program (PAPP).  About 1 million ha of rice land 
have been ‘diverted’ so far under PAPP.  Farmers participating in the Production 
Adjustment Promotion Program can also benefit from a price deficiency payment 
program which pays up to 80% of the difference between a seven-year moving average 
and actual prices.
3    
Since April 2004, a new reform policy, the ‘Rice Policy Reform Law’ has been 
implemented to divert rice production by limiting volume of production per prefecture. 
The government will give farmers who participate in the new program about 10% of their 
existing income. 
In Korea, about 91% of total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), which 
amounts to 1268 billion Won (or about 1 billion USD) a year, is for rice alone.  Price 
support policy in Korea involves direct government purchase of part of the production at 
a price 25% higher than market (domestic) price.  Under URRA, government has reduced 
price and quantity of the government purchase.  Although Korean government purchases 
of rice now represent only a small fraction of the total production, AMS remains large 
because domestic market price is much higher than the border price. 
                                                 
3 The Government of Japan aims at changing the structure of rice production and improving efficiency of 
production by encouraging the move towards large-scale farming.  But the reform faces the hurdle of strong 
social ties among farmers in rural communities (which will be broken once the farm is managed by a few 
individuals and some of the small farmers move out) and of smallholders’ reluctance to sell their lands. 
   12
In the U.S., a price support program is currently implemented in the form of 
marketing loan of about 143 US dollars (USD) per metric ton (MT) of paddy rice.  
Moreover, U.S. producers receive income support through two payment programs: a 
fixed decoupled direct payment and a decoupled counter-cyclical payment.  The U.S 
government offers also contract payments to its farmers to reduce acreage. There are 
conservation programs that take land out of production along with financial help to install 
better practices of land conservation..  There has been little adjustment in the rice 
program as rice represents only a small fraction of agricultural activity; the U.S rice 
imports are 12 % of domestic consumption.  Nominal rice PSE in the U.S is estimated at 
120 USD per MT of milled rice in 2002. 
Australia has the lowest level of producer support among the OECD countries.  
In 2002, nominal PSE is estimated at 17 USD per MT. 
In Taiwan, government procurement to ensure food security has been limited to a 
smaller amount per hectare.  Government purchase (26% of production between 1996 
and 2000) is stocked and used to maintain price within certain ranges. In 2000, 
guaranteed price per MT was about seven times higher than f.o.b price (USD 981 vs. 
USD 144). Under the ‘Riceland Diversion Program’, more recently replaced by the ‘Rice 
Paddy Utilization Adjustment Program, Taiwan started reducing support (which was 30-
40% of AMS in 2001) to farmers and encouraged them to divert to other crops..   13 
OECD Trade Policies 
High tariff rates and limited quota on import, and high export subsidy characterize 
the trade policies of high-income developed countries producers of rice in OECD.  These 
policies remain in place despite efforts to dismantle them and despite trade preference 
towards selected low-income countries. 
The EU applies tariff escalation; tariff for milled rice import is, for instance, 
about 416 Euros per ton while that for paddy import is 211 Euros per MT.  Tariffs on 
variety of rice such as brown Basmati from India and Pakistan were low and have been 
eliminated recently.  Countries in the Africa Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group and the 
EU’s Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) receive a quota of 110 thousand MT with 
little or no tariff.  The EU subsidy expenditure for rice export, following the Uruguay 
Round has been limited to 37 million Euros per year.  Moreover, export refunds are set to 
133 thousand tons of milled rice per year. 
Japan shifted from absolute quota to tariff rate quota in 1999. Quota is 0.682 
million MT per year (7.2% of average consumption) including rice products and 
preparations. In-quota tariff is zero but over-quota is high, about 341 Yen per kg (about 
USD 2800 per MT), in 2001.  Imported rice is purchased by the government and exported 
as food aid or sold to local food processors who use rice as an input.  The government 
food agency holds the exclusive right to import rice and collects a margin of up to 2.41 
Yen per kg (USD 200 per MT) when rice is sold.  Japan imports only expensive and 
relatively high quality Japonica rice from Australia and US (California).     14
Rice imports to the U.S. are highly protected also.  For instance, a tariff of 14 
USD/MT is applied for milled rice,21 USD/MT for brown rice, and 18 USD/MT for 
paddy rice
4.    US exports account for 12% of global rice trade.  An Export Credit 
Guarantee Program was implemented to help foreign importers deal with unfavorable 
treasury problem or exchange rate fluctuation and to ensure that the U.S exporters will be 
paid.  The Export Enhancement Program was implemented only between 1986 and 1996, 
and it has not been reinstated. 
In Korea, because rice production dominates Korean agriculture any trade 
measure related to agriculture affects rice sector. Korea does not export rice, but imports 
relatively low price and low quality of Japonica and Indica rice from China and India to 
maximize the difference between domestic price and international price and to fulfill its 
WTO engagement.  Also, Korea avoids importing high quality Japonica rice (mainly 
produced in Australia, California, and northern China), which is far cheaper than 
domestically produced rice. 
Korea had lifted also non-tariff barriers, but the tariff remains high.  It is 
committed, however, to increase its minimum market access from 1% of consumption to 
4 % by 2004.  Korea shielded itself under the WTO provision to set an absolute quota 
rather than tariff-rate quota.  (Only the absolute quota, not the tariff quota, determines the 
border price and affects the measure of agricultural support)  Recently, a new agreement 
has been reached to double Korea’s minimum access quota by 2014 at a 5% tariff rate; 
rice imports would be spilt between two sources: the large japonica exporters such as 
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Australia, China, Thailand and the United States; and other exporters that Korea qualifies 
as most-favored-nations. 
Since its accession to WTO in January 2002, Taiwan agreed to a minimum access 
of 144,720 MT per year at zero tariff, although a markup to import up to USD 740 per 
MT is allowed. 
2.4.  RICE POLICIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Achieving food security and protecting domestic rice sector dictates major 
policies in developing countries. Many rice producing countries from the developing 
world have started to move away from taxing to supporting the domestic rice production.  
Argentina 
Argentina produces high quality long grain rice and was the second largest rice 
exporter, after Uruguay, in Latin America  in 2002, exporting about 220 thousand MT 
tons of milled rice.  There has been no specific support program for rice in Argentina.  
Since April 2002, the government of Argentina increased export taxes on grain to 20% in 
order to increase revenue and limit domestic price hike.   
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh is a large rice producer.  In 2002, Bangladesh produced 38 million 
tons of paddy rice,  exceeding Vietnam’s production, and yet, it had to import 943 
thousand MT of milled rice because of supply shocks.  Rice trade liberalization started in   16
1994.  Tariff rates have changed over the few years.   In 2000, Bangladesh imposed a 5% 
import tax and raised it to 25% in 2001(in addition to mid-year duty of 10% which was 
later dropped, income tax of 3% and development surcharge of 2.5% was applied).  Since 
2003, the tariff rate has been 22.5 %.  These have contributed to a high domestic price in 
comparison to the world price.   
Brazil 
Brazil has been the largest rice producer outside Asia.  It produced more than 10 
million MT of paddy rice in 2002.  Brazil’s rice production support amounted to a 
nominal PSE of 107 USD per MT in 1987.  Brazil’s rice market has been open with 
relatively little protection remaining.  Imports come from the U.S and especially two of 
its neighbors, Argentina and Uruguay. 
China 
China, the largest world rice producer− producing 177 million MT of paddy rice 
in 2002 − taxed rice farming until 2000.  The 1999 ‘New Price and Procurement Policy’ 
eliminated government purchase.  After 2000, support emerged and the nominal estimate 
of China’s PSE in 2002 was about 5 USD/MT of milled rice.  China’s imported long 
grain rice and rice consumption there shows some changes towards high quality Indica 
rice as per capita income grows. 
Also, in 2002, China negotiated a TRQ of 2.7 million MT (1.3 MT long grain and 
the rest for short grain) and imported long grain rice from Thailand. In 2003, TRQ was   17
2.25 million MT for long grain and 1.53 for short grain.  Within quota tariff was 1% and 
over quota tariff reached 64% by 2004. 
China exports its short grain rice to Russia, Japan, South Korea and its long grain 
rice to developing countries in Asia and Africa.  China’s exports are controlled by the 
state trading agency, China Food Corporation (COFCO). 
Egypt 
Egypt produces medium grain rice and has become the largest rice producing 
country in Africa and in the Middle East region.  In 2002, production reached 5.6 million 
MT of paddy from which 463 thousand metric tons of milled rice was exported mostly to 
the Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and United Arab 
Emirate.  Egypt’s tariff rate was lowered to 20 % in 2002. 
India  
India is the second largest rice producer, producing 108 million tons of paddy rice 
in 2002.  Like China, India had persistently taxed rice farming until 2002 and 25 % of 
harvested crop was purchased for government stocks (grain procurement policy).  
Nominal PSE reached 78 USD per ton of milled rice in 2002.  Moreover, export subsidy 
is estimated at 50% of procurement prices in 2001.  India exports both high and low 
quality long grain rice.  Although it was a net rice exporter in 2002, it still imports rice at 
high tariff rates which are 80% for brown rice and 70 % for milled rice.      18
Indonesia 
Indonesia is a large rice producing and consuming country.  Indonesia was the 
third largest rice producer in 2002 with 52 million tons of paddy produced
5.  In 
Indonesia, government stabilizes consumer and producer prices through the Badan 
Urusan Logistik, BULOG, which is a state trading enterprise.  Indonesia is one of the few 
developing countries that have consistently supported rice farming.  In 2002, for instance, 
nominal PSE in Indonesia reached 95 USD per MT. 
Indonesia has become the world’s largest rice importer, mostly of low quality 
long grain rice, because of its high per capita consumption and frequent adverse supply 
shocks. In 2002, it imported about 1.9 million MT of milled rice equivalent, three fourth 
of which came from Thailand, Vietnam, and India.
6  Indonesia imposes high protection 
on imports through the state trading BULOG.  The quantitative import control lasted until 
1998, the year when rice trade was liberalized only for a short period.  However, 
government reinstated BULOG’s monopoly power in 2000, after price floor could not be 
maintained. 
In recent years, effective rate of protection in Indonesia was estimated at about 
100 % and domestic price has been almost twice the border price.  But important flow of 
rice smuggling tends to reduce the price difference.
7  Due to bumper crops, rice import 
                                                 
5 Projection for 2004 was 54.3 MT. 
6 For brevity, we will refer to "milled rice equivalent" as "milled rice" since paddy trade is a small portion 
of the total. 
7 Current specific tariff is Rp430/kg, (the equivalent of a 30% tariff rate). Producer associations want to 
increase up to 36% tariff equivalent.   19
was banned since 2003/2004.  The ban continues to be in effect; this could change, 
however, if the 2004 tsunami disaster lowered the stock of rice to a critical level.   
Pakistan 
Pakistan was the fifth largest rice exporter in 2002, exporting 1.7 million MT of 
both high and low quality long grain rice.  Pakistan has no production support program in 
place.  Rice export was liberalized since 1996 (Calpe, 2004). 
The Rest of Latin America  
Colombia and Peru produced 2.3 and 2.1 MT of rice paddy in 2002 and are 
among the largest rice producers in Latin America besides Brazil.  They remain, 
however, net rice importers because of lack of infrastructure that handicapped rice 
distribution.  Columbia and Peru imported 62 and 34 thousand MT, respectively, in 2002.  
Main supply sources are Uruguay, Argentina, and the U.S. 
Philippines 
The Philippines was the second largest rice importer, following Indonesia, 
importing 1.2 million MT of milled rice in 2002.  The National Food Authority (NFA) 
has protected local producers from lower price (although they are more successful in   20
protecting rice ceiling than rice floor) by purchasing rice and releasing in the market to 
keep the price below an acceptable level for consumers.
8   
The NFA controlled rice import through quantitative restrictions until 2004; 
application of quantitative restrictions was only allowed to the Philippines, Japan, and 
Korea in 1995.  Such restrictions put domestic retail price of low quality rice at 2.3 times 
higher than world price in 2001.  Main import sources are the US, China, Thailand, 
Vietnam and Australia.  Import consists mainly of low quality (more than 25% broken 
kernel) rice.  Local variety is of higher quality.  Import was projected to be around 0.7 
million MT in 2004. 
Madagascar 
Producing 2.7 million MT of paddy rice in 2002, Madagascar has been for many 
years the second largest rice producer, after Nigeria, in Sub Saharan Africa.  Because of 
internal supply shocks and high per capita consumption, Madagascar still imports rice. 
Rice import was about 61-100 thousand MT in 2002.  Liberalization of rice trade started 
in the early 1990’s, although government has maintained a buffer stock to mainly protect 
consumers from rising prices.  Rice farming has been always taxed by a price ceiling for 
many decades.  In 2004, because of a series of hurricanes flooding rice fields, domestic 
rice increased rapidly and the government of Madagascar encouraged rice import to 
dampen and stabilize retail price at Ariary 700,000 (equivalent of USD 350) per MT.  
                                                 
8 Literature provides no PSE for the Philippines.   21
The government has relaxed import procedures and facilitated shipment and local 
distribution for local importers. Madagascar has no specific tariff left on rice.   
Myanmar 
Until the mid-60’s Myanmar was the world’s largest rice exporters, outpacing 
Thailand.   Myanmar produced 23 million MT of paddy rice and ranked third (after 
Vietnam and Thailand) in 2002.  But Myanmar’s export was only 0.7 million MT of 
milled rice in 2003, most of it went to West Africa.  Myanmar has a potential to expand 
production and export because its soils and climate are favorable to rice farming.  Despite 
such comparative advantages, domestic problems, such as insecurity and lack of 
infrastructure impede Myanmar’s expansion of rice production and export. 
Nigeria 
Nigeria is a large rice consuming and importing nation.  In 2002, its import of 
nearly 1.2 million MT of milled rice was the second largest in the world.  Nigeria’s local 
production is highly protected by high tariff.  Import was banned until 1994 and 
minimum import prices were imposed for tariff calculation purposes (Calpe, 2004).  In 
recent years, Nigeria has applied tariff rates ranging between 50 and 100% depending on 
the origins and the type of rice.  For instance, tariff rates on parboiled rice, mostly 
imported from the US reached 119 % in 2002/2003. 22 
Thailand 
Thailand is the world’s largest exporter of rice, especially high quality and 
aromatic rice.  It exported more than 7 million MT of milled rice in 2002.  Thailand taxed 
its export until 1985 believing it had market power on the export market (Warr 2001).  
Thailand supports local producers through a loan program under the Bank for Agriculture 
and Agricultural Cooperative.  Loan price was set at 95% of government target price 
which yielded approximately 10% price support in 2002.  Government stocks increased 
through loan default.  Because of the importance of rice export in the country’s economy, 
Thailand’s government still retains limited control on rice exports, although it has 
allowed a group of highly competitive local companies to expand Thailand’s rice export. 
Vietnam 
Vietnam has emerged as the third largest rice exporter and producer, producing 35 
millions MT of paddy rice, in 2002.  Vietnam has no specific production or export 
support program  ; it moved from imposing export quota, until late 1990’s to supporting 
its rice farming.  Nominal PSE in 2002 was 53 USD per MT.  Rice export thrived, 
reaching 3.2 million MT of milled rice in 2002 but remains under government control 
and the state owned Vietnam Food Corporation (VINAFOOD).  23 
Uruguay 
Uruguay is the only country that exports more than two third of its rice 
production.  Milled rice export reached 651 thousand MT in 2002.  Along with 
Argentina, Uruguay is the largest rice exporter in Latin America, supplying Brazil and 
Peru.   Uruguay has no specific production and export subsidy policy. 
Other important players in the world rice market  
Cuba imports about 400 thousand MT of rice per year from Vietnam and China.   
Iran is a large importer, importing about 1 million MT of milled rice in 2002.  India, 
Thailand, and Vietnam are Iran’s main suppliers.   
Iraq has always been a major importer of long grain rice.  In 2002, Iraq’ rice 
import demand was estimated at 1.2 million MT, i.e. more than 4% of world import.  
Vietnam has been Iraq’s primary traditional rice supplier.  The lifting of the economic 
embargo with US led-invasion of Iraq has opened up Iraq’s rice market of long grain rice 
to U.S rice farmers. 
In recent years, Russia’s rice import fluctuated between 350 and 400 thousand 
MT per year of milled rice. In 2002, Russia imported 406 thousand from Vietnam (46%), 
China (32%), India (9%), and Thailand (8%).  Russia’s rice import consists mainly of 
high quality indica rice.  Import tariff rate is 10%, but no less than a minimum tariff set at 
Euro 30 per MT.  Russia has no import quota.    24
Countries in West Africa under the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (UEMOA) include  Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Burkina Faso, 
Niger, Benin and Togo.  These countries apply a Common External Tariff (TEC).  Tariff 
rates are different for three main qualities of rice: 32 % tariff rate for broken 0-15% and 
for over 35 % broken rice; and 12% for 16-35% broken rice.  These countries consume 
about 77% of medium quality rice (with 15-35 % broken kernels) and 22% for the low 
quality rice containing more than 35% broken kernel. 
Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, the largest rice importers in the UEMOA, imported 
716 and 860 thousand MT in 2002.  Import sources include Thailand, China, India, and 
Vietnam in 2002.  Migration out of rural areas (due to political instability in Cote 
d’Ivoire) and unfavorable rainfall distribution reduced domestic production and increased 
import to keep up with the population growth.  
2.5  MAIN ISSUES FOR THE WTO NEGOTIATIONS 
 One of the objectives of the URAA round in 1995 was to remove policy 
distortions in rice, but it produced little change in rice trade and policies.  The Doha 
Round launched in 2001 has attempted to remedy the URAA limitations on three topics 
of the agreement: market access, domestic support, and export competition.   
On Market Access 
The URAA asked for tariffication and especially that the developing countries 
meet the 24% tax reduction and developed countries the 36% tax reduction by 2004.    25
Future negotiations would consider more tariff cuts on both sides based on the WTO 
formula, the Harbinson proposal.  Such proposal asks for tariff reductions by 25-35 % in 
developing countries and 40-60 % in developed countries over a period of five years.  For 
indica rice trade, there will be pressure for the importing countries in West Africa (such 
as Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal) and Indonesia to lower their high and often prohibitive 
tariffs.  Also, the role of the state trading enterprises in these countries will be discussed.  
But developing countries would continue to resist these cuts based on food security 
concerns and on protection of poor rice farmers from cheaper rice imports.  Negotiations 
will focus on setting these bounds and whether some flexibility such as safeguards 
against currency fluctuation or rice dumping can be accepted.   
On the other hand, pressure will continue for the developed countries to increase 
their minimum import quota and reduce the over-quota tariff, especially in Japan and 
Korea for short grain rice.  Opening in the short/medium grain rice market will interest 
exporting countries such as Australia, China, Egypt and even the United States.  
Developing countries hope to follow the success of the negotiation on basmati rice, 
which can now enter tax-free the European Union. 
On Domestic Support  
The URAA limited subsidies to 5% of the value of production for developed 
countries and 10% for developing countries in the amber box.  However, subsidies under 
the blue box that mostly include compensation from the ‘set aside’ policy have raised 
developing countries’ concern.  For developing countries, subsidies in the blue box are   26
just an extension of the amber box, which is an excuse to make distorting subsidies legal. 
Furthermore, recommendations to prevent developing countries from increasing their 
support to rice farming are likely to be challenged.  Developing countries would likely 
ask for an increase in the support limits.  
On Export Competition  
Reducing and  eliminating high levels of implicit and direct export subsidies in 
developed countries would continue to be central to the negotiation.  Developing 
countries, except for a few such as India, Vietnam, and Thailand, are already prohibited 
from subsidizing rice exports. Also, developed countries would continue to debate among 
themselves on the elimination of the state trading enterprises that control rice import in 
Canada and New Zealand. 
For many agricultural products including rice, developing countries will argue 
also for maintaining and extending the special and differential treatment (SDT) 
provisions in the WTO, especially in the face of erosion of preference.  Protection of 
poorest farmers, economic stability, and food security concerns are the backbone of the 
arguments (FAO, Bureau et al. 2006).  The SDT provisions embrace some flexibility on 
rules, such as postponing the deadline for compliance with SPSS regulations, limiting the 
tariff cuts, and maintaining certain levels of domestic support for developing countries.  
Whether these flexibilities intrude or not in the advancement of the WTO agenda remains 
debatable.  27
3.  IMPACTS OF DISTORTIONS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
3.1   ISSUES 
The high degree of segmentation and market structure among different rice 
varieties, qualities, and forms imply that no uniform policy analysis applies to all these 
rice submarkets.  Past studies on rice trade liberalization often faced the difficulty of 
disentangling the rice market mainly because of lack of data and of the differences in the 
number and characteristics of traders involved.  However, a close look at the access and 
export competition in a specific rice market at a country level is needed to generate 
meaningful recommendations.  The objective of this part of the study is to analyze the 
impact of a likely change in policies for three distinct rice markets, taking into account 
their structure.  Specifically, the study examines (i) the import and export market of long 
grain milled rice in Latin America; (ii) the import market of ordinary white long grain 
rice in Indonesia; and (iii)  the milled japonica rice market in Japan.  A particular 
attention is paid to the market structure and interaction between trading countries that 
may use different strategies to increase their market shares or profits.  The study provides 
illustrations of both, the impact developed countries’ policies on developing countries 
and the impact of policies in some developing countries on other developing countries. 
Tariffication and Rice Trade Liberalization for Rice Importers in Developing Countries 
Many developing countries, especially those with poorest rice farmers, are 
currently importing rice.  Removal or reduction of the high level of subsidy and   28
protection in OECD countries, and reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers in rice 
importing countries are central to the negotiation on liberalizing rice market.  Such 
reforms would lead to a world price increase that will benefit rice farmers and exporters 
in developing countries.  But, tariff reduction in importing countries and subsidy 
reduction in exporting countries produce two opposing effects on domestic price and 
import volume.  Tariff reduction will increase import volume and the world price, but it 
will reduce the domestic price.  Reduction of subsidies in exporting countries will reduce 
trade volume, but it will increase domestic and world prices.  Changes in domestic price 
and trade volume depend on which policy produces the largest effect and on the elasticity 
of the excess demand and that of excess supply.  The outcome interests developing 
countries, such as Nigeria and Côte  d’Ivoire and Indonesia, which apply high tariff and 
pursue price stabilization programs.
9  
Figure 3 depicts these policies under tariffication or tariff-rate quota (TRQ) 
framework (Moschini, 1991).  It is assumed that import exceeds the minimum access, i.e. 
the over-quota tariff is binding, so that the excess demand curve (ED0) intersects the 
upper part of the kinked excess supply curve (ES0).  Initially, with export subsidies on the 
exporting side and tariff on the importing side, trade volume is M0, domestic price (in the 
importing country) is Pd0 and world price is Pw0.  Tariff reduction will shift the excess 
supply curve down (to the left) from ES0 to ES1.  Import and world price will expand but 
domestic market price will fall below Pd0.  A significant reduction in export subsidy will 
                                                 
9 Since the level of protection in the long grain high quality rice market is relatively low, a significant 
reduction in subsidies will definitely have the most significant impacts on the high quality, long grain rice 
market.   29
shift the excess supply curve from ES1 to ES2.  In this figure, the results of the two 
policies, compared with the starting scenario (where excess supply is ES0), lead to an 
increase in the world price.  However, what happens to import volume and domestic 
prices in the importing countries depends much on how significant the effect of reduction 
in export subsidies from the exporting side is in comparison with the effect of tariff 
reduction from the importing side.  Only a significant reduction in export subsidy will 
lead to an increase in domestic price to Pd2 and a fall in import volume to M2, as the 
figure shows.   
 
Figure 3—Tariff and subsidy reductions under TRQ model  
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The contraction in trade volume and, especially, the increase in the world price 
that follow the reduction or removal of subsidies in developed countries constitute an 
opportunity for other exporters from developing countries to expand their market shares.  
But, for rice producers and importers in the developing world the change in domestic 
price is important because of the tradeoff between protecting domestic consumers from 
price hike and keeping the farm price above a certain level set by the government. 
Direction of the changes in the world and domestic prices remains the same in the 
case of unfilled quota (ED intersects ES at the lower kink of the ES curve).  Reduction of 
tariff or subsidy does not provoke any change in price and import volume as long as ED 
intersects ES at a point in the vertical portion of the ES curve before and after the policy 
change.  There are, however, a few exceptions.  For instance, it is always possible that a 
reduction of tariff alone will turn an initially non-binding minimum access quota into 
binding as import volume expands.  Also, the over-quota tariff combined with the 
minimum access rate puts a limit on how much the exporting country can spend on 
export subsidies.  Subsidy level cannot be set above the over-quota tariff levels—
(rigorously, ES1 moves back only up to ES0 after subsidy reduction). 
Appendix A provides an algebraic explanation of these price changes, showing 
the two opposing effects of tariff and subsidy reductions.  This framework provides a 
basic understanding of most of policy analysis and implications in the segmented rice 
market for rice importers in the developing world.31 
3.2  LONG GRAIN MILLED RICE TRADE IN LATIN AMERICA 
The objective in this section is to measure the effects of the reduction (or 
removal) of producer subsidies in the OECD countries (mainly in the U.S), especially on 
world prices, and on importers and other exporters competing in the market for indica 
rice in Latin America.  Since 75 % of rice traded in the international market is indica rice 
and 75% of rice traded is high quality rice, it is likely that at a higher percentage of rice 
traded in the international market falls under the category of high quality white milled 
indica rice.  High quality indica rice is defined here as fully milled, non-parboiled, long 
grain rice, with low percentage of broken kernel (less than 20%).  The usual references in 
this category include the ‘100 % Grade B’ rice from Thailand, 5% broken kernel rice, 
also from Thailand, and the ‘4% number 2 from the U.S’.  
Although large exporters such as Thailand, and more recently Vietnam have 
emerged as prominent exporters, the US remains the leading exporter of high quality long 
grain rice.  In 2003, the US exported 934 thousand tons of long grain milled rice to 
Russia, Indonesia, Canada, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Haiti, Latin America, and Philippines.  
The EU, Iran, and Iraq are also among the world’s importers.  Argentina and Uruguay are 
the main exporters in Latin America,  mainly exporting to Brazil and Peru.  For instance, 
Table 2 shows the destination of Uruguay’s export in 1996. 
 32 
Table 2—Uruguay milled rice exports by destination, 1996 
 
Country Metric  Tons Percentage 
 (000's)   
Brazil       343,080             64.7  
Peru         72,228             13.8  
Senegal         50,898               9.6  
Iran         39,562               7.4  
Chile         10,734               2.0  
Mexico           3,350               0.6  




Protection in the importing countries for high quality long-grain rice market is 
much lower than in low quality long-grain market.  Importers of high quality indica rice, 
such as Brazil and Russia have recently reduced their already low tariff levels.  Iran, 
another importer, has practically no official tariff in place.  However, the exporting side 
is characterized by high producer price support (especially from the U.S) which 
constitutes implicit export subsidies, along with direct export subsidies. 
We examine the case of import markets of Brazil and Peru, the largest rice 
producers in Latin America.  Table 3 shows levels of production and import in the 
America’s in 2002, and the important place of the U.S export, especially to Canada, 
Haiti, Peru, and Mexico.  Our goal is to determine how the reduction in subsidies on the 
U.S side will affect world prices and exports in these developing countries and on 
regional exporters such as Argentina and Uruguay. 33 
Table 3—Milled rice production and imports in selected countries, 2002 
    Import from the US     Production 
(1000 tons) 
Total Import 
(1000 tons)  (1000 tons)  (% over total 
imports) 
Brazil 7,050  1,117  347      31 
Canada n.a.  242  175  72 
Chile 90  153  12  8 
Haiti 65  345  339  98 
Mexico* 185  582  582  100 
Peru 1,597  32  22  69 
Nicaragua 191  102  102  100 
           Source:  US Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture Service. 
                        * 2001 figures for Mexico.  
 
 
Brazil produced about 11 million MT of paddy rice (i.e. about 7.5 million MT of 
milled rice equivalent) in 2003, being the largest rice producer in Latin America 
(outpacing Uruguay at 1.2 million MT and Argentina at 0.71 million MT of paddy rice).  
Nevertheless, Brazil imported rice from the U.S and two of its neighbors, Argentina and 
Uruguay.  In 1996, 65% of Uruguay’s export went to Brazil.  Brazil provides an 
appropriate case study because it is a large rice producer but has to import rice because of 
the open market policy.  Table 4 shows that paddy price in Brazil is seven times higher 
than that in Argentina and Uruguay.  
 
Table 4—Paddy price in selected countries, $/MT 
Year Argentina  Brazil  Peru  Uruguay  US 
2000 116  701  166  106 124 
2002 125  844  148  116 85 
Source: FAO. 
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Peru is another large rice producer in Latin America with 2.2 million MT of 
paddy rice (about 1. 6 million MT of milled rice) in 2002.  Lack of infrastructure 
impairing rice distribution limits consumers’ access to domestic production.  Peru has to 
import rice mainly from the U.S, Uruguay, and Argentina.  Peru’s milled rice imports 
equivalent, however, dropped from a yearly average of 246 thousand MT in 1995-1998 to 
54 thousand MT in 1999-2002 (USDA).   
Framework 
a)  Import demand (Excess demand): 
 
Assume that excess demand Qm is a function of import price (an index price) Pm, 
domestic price Pd and income I.     
 
  Qm = f(Pm, Pd; I)  (1a) 
 
 
Assume that substitutability of rice from the U.S and non-U.S sources is 
imperfect, and that the residual import demand from a non-U.S source Qn is a function of 
the following: the price of imported rice from the non-U.S source, Pn; the U.S price, Pus; 
and expenditure on rice import from the non-U.S source, In. 
 
  Qn= Qn(Pn, Pus, In )  (1b) 
 
b) Export  supply 
 
Using Goldstein and Khan (1978), export supply is a function of the ratio between 
domestic price (in the importing countries) and fob price Pusf and Pnf in the exporting   35
countries.  Also, it is assumed that export supply is related to input cost ICOST and 
bilateral exchange rates ER between the traders.
10 
    Xus  = Xus(Pd/Pusf ,  ICOSTus , ERus), (2a) 
 
   Xn   = Xn(Pd/Pnf ,  ICOSTn , ERn)  (2b) 
 
c)  Identity: market clearing conditions 
 
  Qm = Xus + Xn ;.  (3a) 
 
  Qn = Xn ; and Qus = Xus  (3b) 
 
 
Exports to Brazil increase as domestic prices rise relative to export prices from 
importing sources (mainly, the U.S, Uruguay, and Argentina) and as export capacity 
increases.   
 
                                                 
10 A basic quantity leadership model provides insights on how suppliers in developing countries would 
react to a reduction of the price support in developed countries.  It is assumed that the inverse of the excess 
demand function is P=aQ+Z, where a<0 is its slope and Z>0 is a demand shifter.  The leader and follower 
export the amounts q1 and q2 (with Q=q1+q2).  The groups ’marginal costs, c1 and c2, are assumed to be 
constant. The follower will choose q2 that maximizes its profit, taking q1 as given.  The solution is the 
reaction function.  Second, the leader will choose q1 to maximize its profit using the follower’s reaction 
function.  The results are as follows.  
q1 =  -(Z+c2-2c1)/2a                                                  (leader) 
q2 =  -(Z-3c2+2c1)/4a                                                (follower) 
P* =  Z – (3Z/4 - c2/4 –c1/2)                                     (equilibrium price) 
Q* = q1+q2 = -(¾)(Z/a)+(1/4) (c2/a)+(1/2) (c1/a)    (equilibrium quantity) 
Because subsidies (especially input subsidies) often reduce the true cost that the subsidized-farmers should 
bear, farmer’s marginal cost increases as subsidy is reduced, i.e., dc1/ds<0.  Consequently, it can be shown 
that dq1/ds>0 and dq2/ds<0, that is, as subsidies decline, the leader’s output declines while the follower’s 
output increases.  World price will increase as subsidies are reduced, dP*/ds <0.  The overall quantity 
traded will be reduced as subsidies decline, dQ/ds*>0, because the decline of the leader’s export is larger 
than the increase in the follower’s export.  We note that the outcome will be the same no matter where the 
reduction of subsidy comes from (the follower or the leader) as long as the reduction of subsidy raises 
production cost, i.e, shifting supply curve upward.  If the exporters purchase input from the same input 
market, the impacts of the change in input cost on competitor’s export volume and price is captured in the 
impacts of exchange rates.  36 
Estimation and Results 
The system of equations (1a) through (2b) is estimated simultaneously for Brazil 
and Peru between 1978 and 2002.  Appendix B1 details the data employed and sources. 
Table 5—Imports of milled rice in selected Latin American Countries (1978-2002):  
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          Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values.  
          Source: Author.   37
The results in Table 5 show that overall, Brazil milled rice import is relatively 
price inelastic.  As expected, import increases as domestic price increases.  Also 
Argentina and Uruguay have become important players in Brazil import market. Price 
elasticity of import from Uruguay and Argentina is relatively small, -0.045, but is 
statistically significant at 0.01 level.  Export supply from non-U.S sources (Argentina and 
Uruguay) increases by 0.7 % as the ratio of domestic price for Brazilian rice increases 
relative to fob prices in these countries by one percent.  The export supply elasticity with 
respect to the ratio of domestic price and the U.S fob price is 2.2 indicating that a 
reduction of the U.S export subsidy leading to an increase in the US fob price by one 
percent would reduce U.S export to Brazil by 2.2 percent.  But an increase in input costs 
(removal of all forms of input subsidies) in the U.S rice farming will have a negative 
impact on U.S export supply.  Likewise, depreciation of Brazil’s Real relative to USD 
has reduced U.S export supply to Brazil. 
Peru’s rice import demand for Argentine and Uruguayan rice is highly elastic; the 
elasticity is - 2.4 and statistically significant.  Moreover, Argentina and Uruguay rice 
supply to Peru increases by 0.35 % as the ratio of Peru’s domestic price to Argentina and 
Uruguay fob price rises by one percent.   On the other hand, an increase in the U.S fob 
price by one percent (because of, say, decrease in implicit or direct export subsidies) 
would reduce U.S export supply to Peru by 1.8 %.  In recent years decline in Peru’s Pesos 
with regard to its trading partners’ currency, especially the USD would reduce the import 
of rice from these countries to Peru. 38 
Implications 
Regional suppliers, especially Uruguay and Argentina play an important role in 
rice export to Latin America.  Although, in recent years, the shares of US rice export 
have declined in large markets such as Brazil and Peru (Childs, 2003), the U.S rice export 
still has significant influence on import demand, especially in Peru.  Moreover, the 
United States still dominates import market in countries such as Haiti, Nicaragua, and 
Mexico.  Reduction of the U.S subsidies can further alter its rice export in the region.  
Moreover, reduction of any form of subsidies on input would reduce the U.S export 
supply.  The average of the total amber box spending for rice for 1999 and 2000 was 
about 213.5 million USD, which, for instance, under the Harbinson proposal would be 
reduced by 60% in five years.  Such a reduction would lead to a high percentage increase 
in U.S fob price and will definitely benefit rice export from the two regional suppliers 
Argentina and Uruguay.       
Rice market in Brazil is large and expanding.  Brazil remains an attractive export 
destination as its domestic rice is produced at a higher cost than in neighboring countries.  
Although Brazil is considering multiplying its import sources, rice exporters in Asia face 
high transportation costs that prevent them from competing with Argentina and Uruguay.  
If the world price rises because of a reduction in the distortion in indica rice, Brazil’s rice 
self-sufficiency and export expansion are possible.  But, the competitiveness of Brazil’s 
rice export would have to match the big comparative advantage of the regional suppliers 
such as Uruguay and Argentina and Asian exporters.  The latter have had the export   39
capacity needed to conquer the large market of long grain rice in the Caribbean and Latin 
America.  
3.3  LONG GRAIN MILLED RICE IMPORT TO INDONESIA  
The objective in this section is to determine the effects on domestic and world 
prices of the distortions especially high level of protection (in the importing countries) in 
the market for low-quality (also called ‘ordinary’) long grain rice.  We define the low 
quality indica as the milled long grain rice containing more than 20% high percentage of 
broken kernels.  Major importers of low-quality long grain rice include Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Bangladesh, and African countries such as Senegal, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, 
and Ghana.  Major producers and exporters of low-quality long grain rice include 
Thailand, Vietnam, India, US, China and Pakistan. 
For low-quality long grain rice market, distortions reside mostly in the high 
protection in low-income importing countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Nigeria that affect exports from their fellow developing countries such as Thailand and 
Vietnam.  Importers of low-quality long grain rice impose high barriers (at least higher 
than for the high-quality long grain rice) to protect local producers of low-milling quality 
rice.  For instance, in Indonesia, the largest rice importer, imports have been under the 
control of BULOG and are totally banned since 2003 because of an unusually high 
production.
11  The ban was expected to last beyond 2004.  Likewise, tariff rate in Nigeria 
                                                 
11 Sidik (2004) discusses more of Indonesia’s trade policy.   40
is estimated at 120% in 2004.  The Philippines through the National Food Authority also 
provides high protection to its domestic production. 
Major exporters of the low-quality indica rice, with the exception of India and the 
US, currently apply little or relatively low levels of (actual and implicit) support.  
Exporters such as China, Thailand and Vietnam had even taxed their export and 
production in the past.  For instance, export taxes in Thailand were high since the 1970’s 
but had been gradually reduced until it was completely abolished in 1986.  Likewise, 
Vietnam export quota had remained until 2000.  Removal of export tax and tendencies to 
subsidize export has led to lower exporting price, threatening domestic production in the 
large importing countries such as Indonesia, and the Philippines. 
Framework 
We assume that certain degrees of monopsony or oligopsony power prevail in the 
market for the low-quality milled indica rice.  The reason is that large importing 
countries such as Bangladesh, and Philippines and especially Indonesia (as well as 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa such as Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria) employ state trading 
firm to control rice imports. 
Figure 4 explains the various policies at work.  Under free trade, Qf amount of rice 
is imported at a price Pf  per unit.  Because of the upward sloping excess supply curve, the 
cost of importing an additional ton of rice must include the average cost per unit and the 
increase in marginal cost for the additional ton of imported rice.  That is, the relevant 
marginal cost curve for the importer is MCim.  Because of its position as a large importer,   41
the import volume is reduced to Qd0 and domestic price to Pd0, at which importers cover 
all of its importing costs.   
Figure 4—Optimal tariff model for state trading importers (adapted from Vousden,  




To bring about such an outcome, the state trading importer imposes a tariff equals 
to (Pd0-Pw) that shifts the excess demand curve ED (which is also the import demand 
curve since exports in these large importing countries are relatively small) to T to restrict 
import at the desired amount Q0.  Exporters are paid Pw per unit and import price for the 
domestic market is kept at price Pd0.  Hence, the state trading importer achieves two 
objectives: (i) protect domestic production by raising import price and limiting import 
volume, and (ii) cover import cost for each unit sold as it imports at lower price, but puts 
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government’s ability to enforce import duties and choose import prices and volume that 
achieve these two objectives.  
Tariff Response to Export Subsidy 
We assume that negotiators agree on subsidy reduction, so that MC shifts to MC’.  
Reduction (increase) in subsidies would force state trading importer with a market power 
to reduce (increase) quantity imported and would increase (reduce) domestic and world 
prices. Tariff response still corresponds mostly to the two objectives which are to cover 
import costs and protect domestic production from low world price.  But the direction of 
change in tariff to achieve the desirable domestic (importing) price is ambiguous and 
depends mostly on the elasticities of the excess demand and supply, and the extent of the 
subsidy reduction that triggers the shift. 
On the one hand, reduction in subsidy would make the supply less price elastic 
and hence, could make the corresponding optimal tariff response higher than its level 
prior to the change.  Figure 4 shows such an outcome in which the state trading importer 
would allow an increase in tariff to ‘accommodate’ the reduction in subsidy as the new 
relevant marginal cost curve is MCim’.  This seems counterintuitive but one reason is that 
the increase in world price will increase importing cost per unit; the importer could react 
by rising optimal tariff rate to cover its importing costs.  Theory of ‘managed trade’ in 
Bagwell and Staiger (1990) offers another explanation which contends that when trade 
volume surges, importers raise protection to deter exporter’s attempt to increase rent   43
seeking through higher export price, and hence to defect from trade agreement.  
Protection devices include raising tariffs and reducing import quota volumes.   
On the other hand, subsidy reduction could lead into tariff reduction.  As world 
price rises the importer feels that protection should not be too high so that tariff rate is 
reduced.  This is especially the case if the state trading importer decides to achieve a 
desirable fixed domestic price by reducing its rent when world price rises.  Besides, it 
might be also that reduction in the level of subsidy may not alter tax rate at all when 
current tax level still covers importing cost as both world and domestic prices increase at 
levels where the ratio between the two prices is unchanged. 
Without prior knowledge of the extent of subsidy reduction, the elasticities of the 
excess demand and supply equation, it is difficult to predict how tariff would change as 
export subsidy declines.  Moreover, beside the optimal tariff arguments, other reasons 
such as inventory management, food security or other political concerns could determine 
the change in tariff.  Only empirical study will determine how tariff rate would change in 
response or independently to subsidy reduction.  The challenge is to separate out the 
effects of optimal tariff from other reasons for maintaining high tariffs in order to predict 
how large importing countries would react to policy reforms in the world market.  
Algebraic Solutions 
First, the study solves algebraically for the market equilibrium conditions and 
then examine how the ratio between importing and world price changes.  We name P the 
unit value of imports from the importer’s view and Pw is the actual price (world price) at   44
which s/he imports rice.  We assume that ρ accounts for the loss in handling or 
depreciation of rice quality between the time of purchasing and time of delivering the 
imported rice.  We assume P = ρ.Qw.   
The importer’s profit function is  w w w Q P Q P − = ) . .(ρ π .  Assuming ρ=1 and 
introduce an ad valorem tariff t on the demand side and subsidy rate s on the supply side, 
the linear demand and supply equations are: 
   [] Z aQ t P + + =
−1 ) 1 (                      (import demand or excess demand) 
   ] [ ) 1 (
1 W bQ s MC P w w + + = =
− ,    (excess supply) 
where P is price, Q import quantity, and W is a host of other marginal cost shifters (input 
or transportation costs).  The large importer equates the perceived value of the marginal 
unit of rice imported to the actual world price plus the marginal cost accruing from 
importing the additional unit of rice. 
 
 (4)    Q P P P w w ' + =   which is the first-order condition (f.o.c) 
or 
  P  = (2bQ+W) (1 + s) 
-1 
 
(It is further assumed that the second-order condition holds) 
 
The solutions to the problem yields the following equilibrium domestic (importing) price 
and import volume 
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Prior to the imposition of any tax, t equals zero in the above equations.  However, the 
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and the corresponding import quantity is  
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By taking the derivatives of the importing (domestic or after tariff) price P* and 
world price (cif) with respect to t and s, it can be shown that both the reduction of tariff or 
subsidy in developed country will increase the world price as dPw/dt <0 and dPw/ds<0. 
Also the domestic equilibrium price will decrease as tariff decreases, i.e. dP*/dt 
>0 but it will increase as subsidy decreases, i.e. dP*/ds <0. This leaves the impacts of the 
reform policies on the after-tax price ambiguous.  The effects of the combination of the 
two policies will be certainly determined by which of the two derivatives has the stronger 
effects.    
Market Integration, Degree of Distortion  
We now focus on the ratio of the equilibrium domestic price to the cif import 
price, P/Pw.  (We take out the star symbol to avoid crowding the notations.)  This ratio is 
often used to determine how integrated and protected a market is compared to the rest of 
the world.  We can write the f.o.c. in (4) as ) 1 ( σ + = w P P , in which σ is the inverse of the 
price elasticity of the excess supply.  σ  contains various information such as the degree   46
of market power, the demand and supply shifters (income, input costs) in the importing 
countries as well as information on the rate of export subsidies on the exporting side.  
Because the average per unit tax t that importer imposes relates the two prices by 
P=(1+t).Pw, we obtain the familiar optimal tariff condition  t = σ, i.e the optimal tariff 
rate being just the inverse of the excess supply elasticity.  The concerns are whether the 
tariff is optimal (since there could be water in the tariff) and how the importer would alter 
tariff in response to the change in the level of subsidies. 
 
Using (5) and (6), the ratio is   
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i.e., the price ratio is a function of the characteristic of excess demand and supply 
equations and especially levels of subsidies and tariff applied. 
From (8), it can be proven that d(P/Pw)/dt >0 , i.e. tax reduction reduces price gap.  
Also, from equation (8) it can be shown that the sign of d(P/Pw)/ds depends on the sign of 
(1-t).  For t<1 the price ratio will increase as subsidy increases: the world price decreases 
faster than import price.  A reason is that the low cost of production and low output price 
from the subsidizing exporter entice a heightening of the protection measure in the 
importing country, hence, rising P/Pw.  Likewise as subsidy is reduced, import poses less 
threat to domestic production in the importing country, which cuts protection, including 
its tariff rate in response.   47
But for high tariff (t>1) the ratio P/Pw would decrease as subsidy increases.  This 
is more in line with the idea that subsidy increase would make the excess supply more 
elastic, that is, as subsidy increases, the inverse of the supply elasticity would decrease 
and optimal tariff response and P/Pw will also decrease.  A decrease in export price due to 
the increase in subsidy still entice protection measure on the part of the large importer, 
but because the level of protection is relatively high, and that the importing cost is 
reduced, protection need not increase by much.   Likewise, reduction in subsidy increases 
export price and the large importer reacts by rising tariff rate to cover the importing cost.  
This espouses the optimal tariff argument.  The response however depends on the import 
demand and the excess supply elasticities, as well as variables such as the supply and 
demand shifters. 
Econometric Model  
  Using (8) and a Taylor expansion of a non-linear relationship between tariff and 
subsidy
12, we propose the estimation of the following: 




m ,   (9a) 
and  
 
                                                 
12 To see the non-linear relationship, we assume that the ratio P*/P*w =(1+teq) where teq is a tax 
equivalent of an optimal tariff, by substitution in Equation (8) and solving for teq, we obtain the following   
 (2bZ-aW)(b(1+teq)-a(1+s))=(1+teq ) (bZ-aW)(2b-a(1+s)).  Solving for teq yields: 
    1
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teq  where A = (2bZ-aW)/(bZ-aW) 
This expression of teq reveals a non-linear relationship between tariff equivalent and subsidy level which 
left undetermined the exact sign of response of change in subsidy on the optimal tax. 





2 1 0 ε β β β θ β β θ + + + + + = INV S S T , βs>0.    (9b) 
 
ER is exchange rate, T is import tax, S is subsidy, Z is a demand shifter, and W is 
a supply shifter.  The ε’s represent error terms.  The parameters θ and β’s  indicate a 
departure from the optimal tariff implementation.  Inventories are added, INV is defined 
as the difference between ending and beginning stock in (9a) to show that decision to 
change tax levels depends on levels of inventories.  Prohibitive tax may follow high 
levels of stock following bumper crops. 
Estimation and Results 
The study applies the model on Indonesia’s rice import.  India, Thailand and 
Vietnam are the main suppliers of low quality indica rice to Indonesia.  For instance, 
between January and June 2003, Indonesia imported 39% of its total rice import of low-
quality rice from Vietnam and 37% from Thailand (World Bank).  These two exporters 
have moved from taxing to lightly subsidizing their exports.
13  India’s support for its 
producers has increased in recent years.  Indonesia’s import tariff remains high and 
becomes prohibitive since 2004, due to a bumper crop.  Appendix B2 explains data and 
sources. 
First we estimate the reduced forms in equations (6) and (7) on the equilibrium 
import price (cif) and import quantity simultaneously with the equation relating subsidy 
levels to tariff levels in (9b).  We represent all variables in log form.  The supply shifter 
                                                 
13 Nielsen (2003) and Minot and Goletti (2000) offers more details on Vietnam’s rice trade policy.   49
W represented by input cost is dropped fearing that it is correlated with the level of 
subsidy.  
Table 6 reports the results of the estimation of the reduced forms.  We note that: 
Table 6—Reduced-form coefficients for Indonesia rice imports: Simultaneous  
       estimation ( 1985-2002) 
  Dependent Variables 




























Inventory -  -  0.131* 
(1.68) 
 N=18 ; System Weighted R-Square =0.94 




-  High rice tariff in Indonesia is strongly and negatively correlated with (world) 
import prices and quantity, as expected:  10% tariff increase reduces import prices 
by 1.2% and especially depresses import volume by 4.3%.    
-  Exporter’s subsidy (or taxation) has little influence on Indonesia’s cif import price, 
which is a further sign of Indonesia’s market power. 
-  There is a positive, although weak, correlation between subsidies and tariff.  
Increase in subsidy on the exporter’s side will entice Indonesia to increase its 
protection through import tax.  The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient on subsidy for the tariff equation indicates that part of the tariff rate is   50
implemented for reasons other than response to subsidies and inventory (for 
instance, to cover import cost) 
-  Income rise would increase consumption and rice import.   
-  As expected, the increase in inventory level will increase tariff rate.  
Second, we estimate the parameters of the system of equation (9a) and (9b).  
Table 7 summarizes the result of the estimation using the linear and the double log-linear 
functional forms.  The two results share similarities except for the effects of inventory 
and income.  We mostly focus on the double log results. In both estimations on the price 
ratio model, we add time trends to account for the change in transportation costs and 
mark up. 
Table 7—Explaining protection of Indonesia’s rice import (1985-2002)   
Variables Level  Double  log  form 
Dep. var: Ratio of domestic  
Price/cif world Price 
  
















Supply shifter (Input Cost)     
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Note: Domestic price means cif plus import duties.  Figures in parentheses are t-values.  
Source: Author.  51 
The results show that the ratio of domestic (importing) price to world (cif) price 
P/Pw (which reflects both optimal tariff rates and other forms of protection—non-tariff 
barriers) certainly grew with the implicit tariff rates.  The coefficient on tariff rate is 
positive and significant.  In 2002, if the official implicit tariff rate were about 58% and 
the price ratio were 1.5, increase of tariff rate to 64% would have increased price ratio to 
1.6.   
The positive and significant impact of currency depreciation on the price ratio 
indicates the market power of the importer.  A 10 % depreciation of currency, making 
rice import more expensive in local currency term, has been an opportunity to increase 
price ratio by 4.4%.  This ‘pricing to market’ has been achieved by either raising Pd , i.e., 
taking profit from local consumers or lowering Pw , i.e. taking profit from the suppliers. 
The impact of the increase in subsidy on price ratio P/Pw is mixed.  Unlike the 
simple linear functional form, the double log form indicates no statistically significant 
correlation between export subsidy and price ratio.  The negative sign seems inconsistent 
with the findings that a one percent increase in subsidy would be retaliated by a 1.4 % 
rise in tariff (from the price equation) and that tariff rates increase with the price ratio 
(from the price-ratio equation).   
An explanation of the negative sign comes from previous section’s analysis on the 
derivative d(P/Pw)/ds that at high tariff rate, P/Pw may decline as subsidy increases.  The 
ratio P/Pw contains information about all forms of protection as well as markups.  As 
export subsidy increases and cif price falls, importer needs not to increase and may even 
reduce other forms of protection while maintaining the already high tariff rate, i.e. the   52
wholesale price fall is at least equal to the cif price fall.  As a result, P/Pw which reflects 
level of various protections (not only tax) remains constant or falls. 
The negative correlation between P/Pw and the level of subsidy finds also an 
explanation, as stated earlier, in the theory of ‘managed trade’ (Bagwell and Staiger, 
1990).  Indonesia’s heightening of protection may have been a measure to deter its 
exporters’ (mainly Vietnam and Thailand) attempt to increase their export taxes for rent 
seeking, especially during periods of high trade volume.  Such a measure forces trading 
partners to stick to current terms of the agreement or at least to cooperate on a new one. 
As expected, tariff rate increase is sensitive to the levels of inventory.  Each 10 % 
increase in inventory per capita would cause an increase on the  tariff rate by 1.5 %.  This 
explains the banning of imports following a bumper crop in 2003-2004 that have raised 
the country’s rice stock by 150%.  
Implications 
Optimal tariff, set to protect domestic sector and cover import cost, is not the only 
explanation of the difference between cif and domestic price for large importer such as 
Indonesia.  Rent seeking (rise in markup) and government’s concerns on food security 
and self-sufficiency are plausible explanations.  However, an important finding in this 
study is that tariff hike is partly a response to the increasing (production and export) 
support on export side.  An increase in subsidy on the exporter’s side distorts trade in two 
ways.  First, export subsidy dampens export price and other exporters’ competitiveness.    53
Second, export subsidy entices large importers, such as Indonesia, to increase protection 
and tariff. 
Indonesia’s main suppliers, India, Thailand and Vietnam had recently stopped 
taxing their production and export.  But Vietnam and especially India have started 
subsidizing export in recent years.  Such an increase in subsidy, especially on export, 
may have already driven a large importer such as Indonesia to retaliate by setting high 
and often prohibitive tariff that would reduce import volume and distort trade further.   
Application of the WTO proposal to cut the high bound rates of tariff on low-
quality rice in large importing countries such as Indonesia, and Nigeria by 35 % would 
lead to lower applied tariff as these countries have had little or no ‘water’ left in their 
tariffs.  But these importing countries would be more reluctant to reduce tariffs if 
exporters, including several developing countries, continue to subsidize their exports.  
The low-quality long grain rice market is among the cases where developing countries 
have to sort out distortions they create among themselves. 
3.4   JAPAN’S MARKET OF MEDIUM/SHORT GRAIN RICE 
The purpose of this section is to examine the likely impact of the reduction of 
production subsidies, tariff, and increase in minimum import (quota) in developed 
countries on the world price and trade volume for short and medium grain rice.   
The highest levels of distortions in the world rice market reside in the market of 
medium/short grain rice.  Protection and producer support are especially high in Japan, 
Korea, and to a lesser extent Taiwan, which are among the largest producing and   54
consuming countries.  Between 2001 and 2003, per-year average producer support in 
Japan and Korea amounts 21 billion USD out of the 22.3 billion USD OECD’s total 
producer support in rice.   
Supply of short/medium grain rice in the world market comes mainly from 
Australia (New South Wales), China (the central and northeast regions), Egypt, Italy, and 
the United States (California).  For instance, the U.S produced 2.44 million metric tons in 
2003, and exported 1.15 million metric tons, about half of the world trade in Japonica 
rice.  Eastern Europe and former soviet countries such as Macedonia and Kazakhstan 
have also exported smaller amounts.  Importers include Turkey, the EU, and countries in 
the Middle East (Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan) and Eastern Europe, (Ukraine, Russia, and 
Albania).   
Policy change in Korea and Japan will have significant impact on prices and 
quantities in these countries.  Further trade liberalization in medium/short grain rice 
market would continue to specifically call for an increase in minimum access and 
reductions of tariff and producer price supports in developed countries especially Japan 
and Korea.   
Framework 
Figure 5 depicts a basic TRQ model for Japan as a large producer with high level 
of production subsidies and high levels of import.  That CIF import price is six times 
higher than producer price and eleven times higher than retail price, which reflects how 
high the protection level is in Japan.   55




Both the increase in minimum access (shift from Mmin to Mmin’) and a tariff 
reduction (shift from ES0 to ES2) will increase world price and dampen domestic price.  
Besides, reduction in producer support (shift from ED to ED’) alone in the importing 
country will increase world and domestic prices.  Overall, the combination of these 
policies increases world (or importing) price and import volume.  The change in domestic 
price depends on how the effect of the reduction of domestic support matches the effects 
of tariff reduction and increase in minimum access. 




  P d=Pm = Pw(1+t) 
 





Price  ES0 (high tariff)  
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Excess demand (Japan) 
  E D :   Z aQ s P m m + = + ) 1 ( 
Excess supply (rest of the world) 
  E S f : f s f s W Q b P + = ,     (under free trade),       for Qs<Mmin   
  Q s  = Mmin                  for Qs=Mmin 
  E S v (over quota excess supply) :  s s s W bQ t P + = +
−1 ) 1 (    for Qs>Mmin    
Market clearing condition (equilibrium) 
  Q m = Qs 
Pm and Ps are import and export prices.  Price Pw is the world price; t and s are tariff and 
subsidy rates in percentage term.
14  Qm and Qs are the quantity imported and supplied.  
The Z’s and W’s are demand and supply shifters, other than tariff and subsidies.  Mmin is 
the import quota level.    
Finding the equilibrium conditions 
Finding equilibrium price and quantity (Pmeq, Qmeq) involves four steps: 
(i)    Solving for (Pmv, Qmv) = {ESv ∩ED}   
 
a t s b
t s W Z
Qmv − + +
+ + −
=
) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 )( 1 (
>0, 
a s t b
aW bZ t
P mv − + +
− +
=
) 1 )( 1 (
) )( 1 (
>0;   (10) 
and as expected  
                                                 
14 The subsidy rate s is the subsidy per unit of excess demand, not subsidy rate per unit of domestic 
production.  Appendix B3 shows calculation on how reduction of domestic support is measured into an 
upward shift in excess demand. 
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  (ii)   If the quota level is not binding, i.e.,  Qmv < Mmin and Qmf ≤ Mmin, 
  t h e n   Qmeq = Qmf and Pmeq = Pweq =Pmf. 
 
  (iii)   If the quota level is binding, i.e., Qmv<Mmin and Qmf>Mmin , 
  t h e n   Qmeq = Mmin; Pmeq =  {ED ∩ (Qm=Mmin)}; and Pweq = {ES0 ∩    
  ( Qm=Mmin)} 
 
  (iv)   If the over-quota tariff is binding, i.e., Qmv ≥ Mmin,  
  t h e n   Qmeq=Qmv, Pmeq=Pmv,   
 
and  
  P weq = {ES0 ∩ (Qs=Qmv)}= and Pw = bf*(Qmv)+Wf. 
Application 
For highly protected rice sectors in countries such as Korea and Japan, the 
minimum access is relatively small, and the case (iv) currently applies, i.e. import is (just) 
above the quota level (since imports include rice product equivalent.) 
Based on (10), the initial quantity, domestic price, and world price are expressed in 
equilibrium as 
a t s b
t s W Z
Qeq − + +
+ + −
=
) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 )( 1 (
>0; 
a s t b
aW bZ t
P eq − + +
− +
=
) 1 )( 1 (
) )( 1 (
>0; Pw = bf*(Qeq)+Wf.   (12) 
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 The study attempts to determine the new equilibrium domestic and world prices and 
import volume Peq’, Pw’, Qeq’ and measure the percentage changes. 
(a)   Increase in minimum access: 
 
scenario 1:  Mmin < Mmin’< Qeq, 
  then increase in minimum access does not have any effect on world & domestic 
  price, nor on quantity traded. 
 
scenario 2:  Mmin’>Qeq, 
then Peq’ = a. Mmin’/(1+s)+Z; 
Qeq’= Mmin’; and  
Pw’= bf *(Mmin’)+ Wf. 
 
(b)   Tariff rate reduction  
  
  As over-quota tariff is reduced from t to t’, we just replace t by t’ in the three 
  expressions above and obtain: Qeq’>Qeq; Peq’< Peq; Pw’>Pw 
 
(c)   Subsidy reduction 
  
  As producer support is reduced from s to s’, we just replace s by s’ in (12) and 
 obtain:  Qeq’>Qeq; Peq’ > Peq; and Pw’>Pw 
 
 
  Moreover, the parameters of the excess supply and demand functions are 
calculated based on the 2003 data and on estimates of elasticities from the literature 
reported in Table 8.  
Table 8—Elasticities for short grain rice market 
  Japan S.  Korea 
Domestic demand elasiticty  -0.11  -0.02 
Retail price transmission  0.40  0.17 
Domestic supply elasticity  0.08  0.01 
Producer price transmission  0.24  0.13 
Import-demand elasticity  -2.98  -5.12 
Income-elasticity of demand  -0.05  -0.25 
Source: Cramer, Hansen and Wailes (1999) 
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Japan rice imports include rice products and preparations to justify that the 
minimum access required is attained.  
Numerical applications based on the model are detailed in Appendix B1 through 
B3. 
  Increase in minimum import quota: Table 9 summarizes the results of the 
simulation on different rates of increase in minimum access based on 2003 figures.  
Japan’s current over quota amount is only at 3.5% of its total import and the minimum 
access is 682,000 MT, that is, 7 % of consumption.  An increase in minimum access 
below 3.5% will not change either the import (reference) price or the retail price in Japan.  
It will take more than 4 years before a yearly minimum increase of 0.8 % has a real 
impact on Japan’s domestic and import prices. 
Import price (Pw) rises rapidly as the rate of minimum access is expanded beyond 
the 3.5% threshold because Japanese import demand is highly price elastic.  But the 
decrease in domestic price due to a more open import market results in modest drop on 
domestic price, which will, nevertheless, benefit the Japanese consumers. 
For instance, assuming a 0.5 price elasticity of world’s supply elasticity, 10% 
increase in minimum access, will rise import price by 14% and reduce domestic price by 
2.1 %.  Lower price elasticity of the world’s excess supply, at 0.1, for instance, in 
short/medium rice will make the increase in import price and decrease in domestic price 
more significant. 
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  Table 9—Increase in minimum access in Japan 
  Year 2003  Increase in Minimum Access 
Minimum Access (MT)   682,000   3.5%  5%  10%  15%  3.5%  5%  10%  15% 
Total Import
 a (MT)    706,065  0% 1.4%  6.3%  11.1%  0% 1.4% 6.3% 11.1% 
In-quota  












































World Excess Supply Elasticity  -  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Import Price (cif) (Pw) USD/MT  348   0%  2.9%  12.5%  22.2%  0%  14.3%  62.6%  110.9% 
Retail Price (USD/MT)  3500                  
Wholesale Price
b (USD/MT)   1840-2000  0%  -0.5%  -2.1%  -3.7%  0%  -0.5%  -2.1%  -3.7% 
  Note: (a)  Total import increase is relative to the total import in 2003.  Total imports include rice products  
                               and preparations.  
            (b)  It is the after tax price (equivalent to wholesale price for large importer) 






  Reduction of tariff rate: Average over quota tariff for rice in Japan was about 
2700 USD/MT in 2003 but could reach 3100 USD/MT for processed rice products (such 
as rice flour) that were included as rice imports.  Table 10 shows the results of the 
simulation for 2.5% and 5 % reduction of the over quota tariff rates per year until2008.  
Under both rates of tariff reduction, the impact on import price is more significant than 
for domestic price.  Import price will grow significantly at about 21% and 44% per year 
under the 2.5% and 5 % decreases in over quota tariff.  In contrast, domestic price will 
only drop by 0.7% and 1.2 % per year on average under the two scenarios. 
Table 10—Reduction of over-quota tariff 
















2003  706 418  2000  706 418 2000 
2004  721 509  1986  737 600 1974 
2005  737 620  1973  769 862 1948 
2006  753 755  1961  803 1237  1922 
2007  763 919  1948  837 1776  1897 




  Reduction of domestic support: Japan’s total PSE on rice reached about 1900 
USD/MT in 2003.  Table 11 shows the effects of 5% and 10% yearly reduction in 
production subsidy in Japan.  These results show that only aggressive reduction rates of 
producer support would have a significant impact on import price and volume.  A ten 
percent reduction of producer support per year would increase import price by 3.3% per 
year. 
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Table 11—Effects of reduction of domestic subsidies per unit of production  



















2003  706  418 2000  706  418 2000 
2004  709  424 2027  711  431 2054 
2005  711  431 2054  717  444 2110 
2006  714  438 2082  722  458 2167 
2007  717  444 2110  727  472 2225 
2008  719  452 2139  733  487 2285 
Source: MAFF for 2003.  Author’s calculation for the remainder 
Implications 
Japan provides no signs of a sudden change in trade policy but these results show 
that increase in TRQ volume and large cuts in tariff and producer support would bring 
significant change in import prices and volumes of Japonica rice. The Harbinson 
proposal (WTO) suggests that minimum access should be increased to at least about 10% 
of consumption, over 5 years in a case like Japan where tariff rate quota is only 7% of 
consumption.  This would increase tariff rate quota to about 974,000 MT, which is a 42% 
increase compared to 2003 tariff rate quota.   If, for example, Japan follows the proposal, 
with 10% increase in minimum access per year, results show that such decision will 
significantly increase import price by more than 60%, which will be beneficial for 
exporting countries, especially those from developing world. 
The over-quota tariff in Japan is at about 900%, and the Harbinson proposal 
would  reduce it to 360% (reduction by 60%) of or at least to 405 % (i.e. reduction by the 
minimum of 45%), over five year period.  If materialized, (i.e. with about 10% reduction 
tariff per year) such a proposal would increase import volume and import prices   63
significantly and beyond the impact of the 5% yearly increase exercised in Table 10.  
Even a relatively modest reduction of the over-quota tariff would have already a 
significant impact on import volume and price.  This is because of the relatively high 
elasticity of import demand in Japan.  Exporters in developing countries such as Egypt 
and China and transition economies in Eastern Europe would benefit from trade 
liberalization in the medium/short grain rice market. 
Under the blue box, Japan rice expenditures amount to about 790 million USD, 
but the Harbinson formula would allow these spending to be included into the amber box.  
That will put Japan’s import below the amber box limit.  Thus, the proposal would have 
no effect on reducing Japan’s support.  However, if other propositions, for example, 
would lead to a decrease of these supports by 10% per year that would result in a 
significant increase in import price by about 16 % in 5 years, which would benefit 
exporters.       
Low water supply for irrigation could, however, limit the expansion of rice 
production and export from important sources such as New South Wales (Australia) and 
northeast China (Childs, 2002) if the international market of the short/medium grain is 
liberalized.  Full liberalization has to lead to significant increases in world prices, at least 
in the short-run, as world’s excess supply elasticity remains low. 
3.5 AROMATIC  RICE 
Aromatic rice includes Basmati rice from India and Pakistan, and especially 
fragrant rice from Thailand.  The U.S produces aromatic rice called texmati, in reference   64
to the basmati variety, mostly for domestic consumption.  Aromatic rice remains luxury 
rice even for high income consumers. Canada, EU, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S are 
among the major importers of aromatic rice.  Demand in aromatic rice has risen for the 
last 10 years because of rising income in importing countries.   
Recently, India has exported about 950 thousand MT per year of basmati rice.  
The EU used to impose a reduced tariff on basmati rice imported from India and 
Pakistan.  But since September 1
st 2004, six out of several basmati varieties produced in 
India and two other varieties from Pakistan enter the EU duty-free.  These varieties are 
‘Basmati 370’, ‘Basmati 386 Type-3’ (Dehra Dun), ‘Taraori Basmati’ or (HBC-19), 
‘Basmati 217’, ‘Ranbir Basmati’, ‘Pusa Basmati’, ‘Kernel Basmati’ and ‘Super Basmati’.  
The EU requires a certificate of authenticity from DNA testing lab for its basmati rice 
imports.  In 2003, India exported 140 thousand MT and Pakistan exported 40 thousand 
MT to the EU. 
In addition, Thailand exported about 2 million MT of jasmine rice in 2003 and 
planned a 10% increase for 2004.   New variety called the Pathum Thani produced and 
exported at lower price is already a boost to the expansion of Thai fragrant rice.   65 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 This study carried out a quantitative analysis of three aspects of the current and 
anticipated reform policies in rice trade.  This analysis took into account high levels of 
differentiation in rice market and organization of three specific markets involved.   
First, it was determined how the reduction in subsidies on the U.S side would 
affect prices and trade volume of long grain indica in regional markets in Latin America.  
The analysis of import market of long grain indica in Brazil and Peru showed that 
although the U.S market shares in these markets have declined in recent years, the US 
remains a significant import source.  Reduction of the implicit export subsidies from high 
level of production support in the U.S would benefit regional suppliers such Argentina 
and Uruguay. 
Second, the study examined Indonesia’s import market to illustrate the effects on 
domestic and world prices of the high level of protection in importing countries and 
subsidies in exporting countries in the low-quality long grain rice market.   It was found 
that despite the optimal tariff argument, tariff hikes in a large importing country such as 
Indonesia are in part a response to increases in export subsidies from the exporting side.  
Also, for a large importer such as Indonesia the level of stocks influences decisions to 
raise tariff.  
Third, the study examined the likely impact on the world price and trade volume 
of an increase in minimum import (quota), and reduction of over-quota tariff and 
production subsidies in Japan for short and medium grain rice.  This study found that   66
aggressive rates of increase in TRQ volume (above 3.5%) and reduction in production 
subsidies would have significant impact on the import volume and price.  The reduction 
of domestic support and especially the high over-quota tariff, even at a small rate, would 
have a significant impact on import volume and price. 
An analysis of these three specific rice markets shows that reducing production 
and export subsidies and protection in developed countries would benefit rice exporters 
from developing countries.  Taking into account the segmentation of the rice market 
offered more insights in the policy interactions between trading partners.  The case of the 
low-quality long grain rice, for instance, indicates that developing countries’ own policies 
have also distorted trade among themselves, the so called ‘south-south’ trade.  Such 
distortions need to be addressed along with those from developed countries during trade 
negotiation.  Unraveling more the policy interaction in the rice trade is central to 
determining the sources and impact of all distortions and will help advance trade 
negotiations toward freer rice market.   67
APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A 
TARIFF AND EXPORT SUBSIDY REDUCTIONS WHEN OVER-QUOTA 
TARIFF IS BINDING 
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APPENDIX B1 
DATA ON BRAZIL AND PERU IMPORT MARKETS 
 
 
Pm , Pn, Pus = Import Prices indexes (cif unit values) for total import, import from                   
non-US sources and from the US;  USD/MT (FAO)  
 
Pd   =   Domestic Price, USD/MT (FAO, USDA) 
 
Pusf, Pnf  =  Export Prices (fob) for US and Uruguay ( FAO USDA) 
 
Qm, Qn, Qus = Import volumes in MT divided by total population, for total import, 
import from non-US sources and from the US (FAO and USDA) 
 
I   =  Income: GDP constant 1995 USD per person (World Bank) 
 
In = Expenditure on rice import from non-US sources (FAO) 
 
ER  =  Nominal exchange rates in Brazil Real and Peru Pesos divided by nominal 
exchange rate of trading partners which are the US and Uruguay (for non-US 
sources); (World Bank). 
 
ICOST = Input cost or price of agricultural and farm equipment:  US Price index of  
  agricultural and farm equipment index of price of farm equipment (US       




DATA ON INDONESIA RICE IMPORT MODEL 
 
 
Pm    = Indonesia wholesale price in USD/MT of ordinary rice, (FAO)  
 
Pw    = Indonesia import price in USD/MT: import value divided by import volume; 
 (FAO) 
 
ER    = Exchange rates: Indonesia’s Rupiah per USD (World Bank) 
 
T      = Indonesia implicit tariff rate (net protection rate %); Thomas and Orden (2004)    
 
S      = Export Support Index: producer nominal protection coefficient for Vietnam; 
  (Mullen and Orden et al. 2004; Nguyen and Grote, 2004)   
 
Z      = Income: GDP per person constant USD 1995; World Bank  
 
INV = Inventory (MT per person): Ending stock –Initial stock, USDA  
  Food price index = Indonesia’s food price index, World Bank    70
APPENDIX B3 
JAPANESE RICE IMPORT MARKET 
 
 
Setting parameter values 
 
  We use the following values from Cramer, Hansen, and Wailes (2003): domestic 
price elasticity of demand = -0.11; domestic price supply elasticity = 0.08; import 
demand elasticity = -2.98; and income elasticity = -0.05.   
  Following the basic linear form of the excess demand and supply equations, the 
parameters are calculated as follows: 
a    =   Slope of the inverse import demand function= (Import Price 2003) / ((import 
  demand elasticity) x (Import Quantity 2003)) 
 
b    =   Slope of the inverse excess supply function = (Export Price 2003)/ ((excess supply 
  elasticity) x (Import Quantity 2003)) 
 
Z    =  Import demand shifter 
 
W  =  Excess supply shifter  
 
ad  =  Slope of the domestic demand function = (domestic demand elasticity) x (Domestic 
  price) 2003/(consumption 2003) 
 
as  =  Slope of the domestic supply function =(domestic supply elasticity) x (Domestic 
  price 2003)/(consumption 2003) 
 
Z and W are obtained solving simultaneously the excess demand and supply equations for 
  the base year 2003.   
 
We employed 2002/2003 data and set over-quota tariff t0 = 3600 USD/MT, on 
subsidy s0=1500USD/MT.  We set wholesale price (price after tax) which is a proxy for 
domestic wholesale price at P0 = 2000 USD/MT; import volume at Q0 = 706065 MT; and   71
import cif price Pw0 = 418 USD/MT; domestic consumption is about 9,750,000 MT, and 
consumer price is about 2500 USD/MT. 
We calculated also the direct impact of subsidy s and tariff on import price and 
volume in elasticity terms: 
 
(dQ/Q)/(dt/t)       = (-1/(b-a) . (t0)/(Q0)   
 
(dQ/Q)/(ds/s)      = (-1/(b-a) . (-ad/(as-ad)) .(s0)/(Q0)   
 
(dP/P)/(dt/t)         = (-a/(b-a)) . (t0)/(P0)   
 
(dP/P)/(ds/s)        =  (-b/b(b-a)) . (-ad/(as-ad)) .(s0)/(P0)  
 
(dPw/Pw)/(dt/t)   = (-bf /(b-a)) . (t0)/(Pw0)   
 
(dPw/Pw)/(ds/s)  =  (-bf /(b-a) .(-ad/(as-ad)) . (s0)/(Pw0) ,  
 
with bf   =  Slope of supply curve under free trade = ( Pw/Q0)/(Excess supply elasticity). 
 
  We assume excess supply elasticity is 0.1.  
 
Increase in minimum access:  
 
Change in import cif price     = % change in import/export supply elasticity 
Change in wholesale price = % change in import/import demand elasticity 
 
Reduction of over quota tariff by t_% 
 
Import volume    (MT)              = Q0 (1+ (-t_% x (dQ/Q)/(dt/t))
n , n= 0, 1, 2.. is period    
 
Import cif price   (USD/MT)    =  Pw0 (1+ (-t_% x (dPw/Pw)/(dt/t))
n                   
 
Average wholesale price (USD/MT) =  P0 (1+ (-t_% x (dP/P)/(dt/t))
n 
   72
Reduction of domestic support by s_% 
 
Import volume    (MT)   = Q0 (1+ (-s_% x (dQ/Q)/(ds/s))
n , where n= 0, 1, 2.. is period    
 
Import cif price   (USD/MT)    =  Pw0 (1+ (-s_% x (dPw/Pw)/(ds/s))
n                   
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